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NOTES
PATTERSON v. McLEAN CREDIT UNION: A
NARROWING OF REMEDIES FOR THE EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION PLAINTIFF
Section 1981 of the United States Code provides that all persons have
the same right as white citizens to make and enforce a contract; to sue, be
parties, and give evidence; to full and equal benefit of the laws; and to
similar punishment, penalties, and taxes.' The language of section 1981 first
appeared in section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.2 Because Congress
believed that the thirteenth amendment may not have given Congress the
power to pass the broad policies of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 3 Congress
4
reenacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in the Enforcement Act of 1870,

1. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject
to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind,
and to no other.
Id.
2. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866 provided:
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power,
excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States;
and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition
of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory of the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
Id. (emphasis added to show language that parallels § 1981).
3. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIII; see also Comment, Developments in the Law-Section
1981, 15 HA~v. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 33, 44-47 (1980) (describing congressional debate over
whether Congress had authority under thirteenth amendment to pass Civil Rights Act of 1866).
4. Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, §§ 16, 18, 16 Stat. 140-46. Section 18 of the
Enforcement Act of 1870 simply reenacted § I of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Section 18
provided:
That the act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and
furnish the means of their vindication, passed April nine, eighteen hundred and
sixty-six, is hereby re-enacted; and sections sixteen and seventeen hereof shall be
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which Congress passed under the newly ratified fourteenth amendment.s
Although the Enforcement Act of 1870 contained all of the language of

section 1981, the exact codification of section 1981 first appeared as section
1977 of the Revised Acts of 1874.6 The unique double enactment of section

1981, first as the Civil Rights Act of 1866, then as the Enforcement Act of
1870, confused the courts for almost a century over the scope of section
7
1981.

In determining the origin of section 1981, some lower courts argued
that section 1981 originated from the Enforcement Act of 1870. 8 Accord-

ingly, because Congress enacted the Enforcement Act of 1870 under its
fourteenth amendment powers 9 and because the fourteenth amendment

enforced according to the provisions of said act.
Id. at § 18. Section 16 of the Enforcement Act of 1870 provided:
That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory in the United States to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedingsfor the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,
andshall be subject to like punishment, pains,penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions
of every kind, and none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom
to the contrary notwithstanding....
Id. at § 16 (emphasis added to show language that parallels § 1981).
5. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 93 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting)
(stating that Congress reenacted Civil Rights Act of 1866 following ratification of fourteenth
amendment to remove doubts of Civil Rights Act of 1866's constitutionality); 2 C. StnnvAN,
M. ZnnmR, & R. RicHARDs, EmpooYmEr DISCRIINATION 462 (2d ed. 1988) (same).
6. 24 Revised Statutes § 1977 (1874). The Revised Acts of 1874 were the culmination
of an effort by Congress to revise and recodify the United States' statutes. Note, Racial
Discriminationin Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 36 U. Cm. L. Rlv. 615,
620 (1969). On June 27, 1866, Congress authorized the appointment of a three member
commission to revise, simplify, arrange, and consolidate all statutes of the United States. Act
of June 27, 1866, ch. 140, 14 Stat. 74 (1866). Specifically, the commissioners were to condense
the statutes, omitting redundant or obsolete enactments, and to make changes to reconcile the
contradictions, supply the omissions, and amend the imperfections of the original text. Id.
7. See generally Reiss, Requiem For An "Independent Remedy':" The Civil Rights Acts
of 1866 and 1871 as Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 961, 97072 (1977) (discussing historical background of § 1981); Note, Racial Discrimination in Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 36 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 615, 615-21 (1969) (same);
Comment, Developments in the Law-Section 1981, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rlv. 33, 35-64
(1980) (same). The primary source of the courts' confusion concerning § 1981 was a historical
note that the commissioners, in organizing the Revised Statutes of 1874, attached to § 1977
of the Revised Statues stating that Congress reenacted § 1977 using § 16 of the Enforcement
Act of 1870. 24 Revised Statutes § 1977 (1874). The note led some courts to conclude that
§ 1981 has a state action requirement. See infra notes 8-11 and accompanying text (discussing
§ 1981 state action requirement). Therefore, the courts refused to apply § 1981 to private
conduct. Id.
8. See Cook v. Advertiser Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212, 1214-16 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (concluding
that § 1981 originated in Enforcement Act of 1870), aff'd on other grounds, 458 F.2d 1119
(5th Cir. 1972). The court in Cook emphasized the historical note appended to § 1977 of the
Revised Statutes. Id. at 1216. Thus, the Cook court held that § 1981 applies only to state
action. Id. at 1217.
9. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (noting that Congress enacted Enforcement
Act of 1870 under Congress' fourteenth amendment powers).
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applies only to state action, 0 the lower courts prohibited section 1981 from
applying to private conduct." In 1968, however, the United States Supreme
Court concluded that section 1981 originated from the Civil Rights Act of
1866.12 Because Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 under its
thirteenth amendment powers 3 and because the thirteenth amendment has
no state action requirement, 4 the Court's holding allowed plaintiffs to use
section 1981 in private actions. 5 Beginning in the early 1970s, the circuit
courts of the United States allowed plaintiffs to use section 1981 in private
employment race discrimination cases.' 6 In 1975 the Supreme Court affirmed
the circuit courts' holdings, admitting in dicta that section 1981 provides a
remedy for racial discrimination in private employment. 17 One year later
the Supreme Court explicitly held that section 1981 prohibits private race
discrimination."'
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879)
(finding that Constitution directs prohibitions of fourteenth amendment to states and that
prohibitions are restrictions of state power); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 55455 (1875) (stating that fourteenth amendment limits state power and not individual action).
11. See Smith v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 50 F.R.D. 515, 518 (N.D. Okla. 1970)
(stating that, absent any clear ruling by United States Supreme Court, court must preserve
general construction of § 1981 as extending only to actions under color of state law); Ex rel.
Davis v. Hartman, 303 F. Supp. 411, 411 (E.D. Tenn. 1969) (holding that essential element
of § 1981 action is that defendant act under state law).
12. Cf. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422 n.28, 441 n.78 (1968) (stating
that § 1981 originated from Civil Rights Act of 1866). The Jones decision evaluated the scope
of § 1982. Id. at 412. In the footnotes, however, the Court specifically stated that § 1981
originated from the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Id. at 422 n.28, 441 n.78.
13. See United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 640 (1882) (finding that Congress enacted
Civil Rights Act of 1866 under thirteenth amendment); cf. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409, 437-38 (1968) (concluding that Congress promulgated § 1982 under Congress'
thirteenth amendment powers). Because the Jones Court concluded that § 1982 and § 1981
originated from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866
under Congress' thirteenth amendment powers. Id. at 422 n.28.
14. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438 (1968) (reasoning that § 2 of
thirteenth amendment gave Congress power to enact laws operating upon acts of individuals
whether state legislation sanctioned individual action or not); WRMA Broadcasting Co. v.
Hawthorne, 365 F. Supp. 577, 581 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (holding that § 1981 has no state action
requirement because Congress passed § 1981 under Congress' thirteenth amendment powers,
which reach private acts).
15. See Brady v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621, 623 (8th Cir. 1972) (concluding that
based on Jones decision § 1981 reaches private discrimination); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses,
Inc., 431 F.2d 1097, 1099 (5th Cir. 1970) (finding that Jones decision interpreted § 1981 to
apply to private acts of employment discrimination), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971).
16. See, e.g., Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Machine Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1379 (4th
Cir.) (allowing § 1981 claim for private racial discrimination), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982
(1972); Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757, 760, (3d Cir. 1971) (stating that
§ 1981 reaches private employment discrimination); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l
Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476, 483 (7th Cir.) (holding that Congress designed § 1981 to prohibit
private job discrimination), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
17. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 459-60, 460 (1975) (stating
that Supreme Court agrees with settled principle among federal courts of appeals that § 1981
affords federal remedy against race discrimination in private employment).
18. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 (1976); see infra notes 43-60 and accompanying text (discussing Runyon decision).
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In addition to section 1981 remedies for private employment cases, a
plaintiff may seek relief from private employment discrimination under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (title VII). 19 Title VII provides a complex
enforcement system to protect an individual from an employer's discrimination regarding hiring, termination, compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment because of the individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. 20 Title VII also prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee for pursuing enforcement of title VII rights. 21
In seeking remedies for private employment race discrimination, plaintiffs usually claim both title VII and section 1981 protection. 2 One major
advantage of section 1981 is that the plaintiff does not have to comply with
the administrative requirements of title VII." Before proceeding under title
VII, a plaintiff must file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC)U within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act.2
After this filing, title VII requires the EEOC to notify the employer of the
charge within ten days. 26 The EEOC then investigates the charge. 27 If the
EEOC concludes that reasonable cause supports the charge, the EEOC
attempts to resolve the charge through the informal procedures of conciliation and persuasion. 21 If informal procedures are unsuccessful, the EEOC
may bring suit. 29 If the EEOC, after investigation, determines that no
reasonable cause supports the plaintiff's charge, the EEOC will dismiss the
charge and the plaintiff may bring a private action within ninety days of

19. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
20. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Section 2000e-2(a)(l) prohibits an employer from refusing to hire
or discharging an individual, or otherwise discriminating against an individual with respect to
the individual's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id.
21. Id.§ 2000e-3(a). Section 2000e-3(a) prohibits an employer from discriminating against
any employee or applicant for opposing any unlawful employment practice or for testifying,
assisting, or participating in an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission investigation. Id.
22. See generally Eisenberg & Schwab, The Importance of Section 1981, 73 CoaimE L.
Rav. 596 (1988) (reporting results of statistical study on title VII and § 1981 in three
jurisdictional districts). Eisenberg and Schwab conducted a statistical study for the fiscal year
1980-81, examining every § 1981 claim that plaintiffs filed in three jurisdictional districts: the
Central District of California (Los Angeles), the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia),
and the Northern District of Georgia (Atlanta). Id. at 598. Eisenberg and Schwab found that
plaintiffs filed 270 title VII claims in the three districts. Id. at 603. Additionally, Eisenberg
and Schwab found that 133 of the title VII claims also included a § 1981 claim, and that only
30 cases relied on § 1981 alone. Id. One author has gone as far as recommending that a
plaintiff in a race discrimination case always should claim under both title VII and § 1981.
Reiss, supra note 7, at 1025.
23. See infra notes 24-32 and accompanying text (describing administrative procedure
for title VII claim).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982).
25. Id. § 2000e-5(e).
26. Id. § 2000e-5(b).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(l).
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receipt of a right to sue letter.30 Similarly, if the EEOC has taken no action
within 180 days, the plaintiff may request a right to sue letter, which allows
the plaintiff ninety days to file suit."' Furthermore, title VII has provisions
for deferring to state agencies if the agencies have jurisdiction over the
matter.3 2 The relative simplicity of filing a legal action, when compared
with the complicated title VII administrative procedure, makes a section
1981 claim procedurally more favorable to race discrimination plaintiffs.33
A second major advantage of section 1981 is that it provides more
remedies than title VII. 4 A plaintiff under section 1981 may recover plenary
compensatory damages,3" as well as punitive damages.3 6 In contrast, title
VII limits the plaintiff to equitable remedies. 7 Additionally, title VII limits
the plaintiff to a two year recovery period for backpay. 3 Section 1981
contains no such limitation.3 9 Finally, under section 1981 a plaintiff has a
constitutional right to a jury trial. 40 Under title VII a plaintiff has no
constitutional right to a jury trial because title VII limits the plaintiff to
equitable remedies. 4' Furthermore, title VII does not provide a plaintiff with
a statutory right to a jury trial.42 Because of the relative simplicity and
increased remedies of section 1981, plaintiffs in the early 1970s began suing
43
under both title VII and section 1981 to redress employment discrimination.

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. § 2000e-5(c), (d).
33. See Reiss, supra note 7, at 1025 (suggesting that plaintiffs use § 1981 to protect
against procedural pitfalls of title VII).
34. See infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text (comparing remedies available under
§ 1981 and title VII).
35. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2375 n.4 (1989) (stating
that in appropriate cases § 1981 may entitle plaintiff to plenary compensatory damages).
36. See id. (stating that in appropriate cases § 1981 may entitle plaintiff to punitive
damages); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975) (stating that § 1981
entitles plaintiff to both equitable and legal remedies including compensatory and punitive
damages).
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982) (providing that, upon finding violation of title
VII, judge may order any equitable relief judge believes is appropriate).
38. See id. (ordering that backpay shall not accrue more than two years from filing of
charge).
39. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975) (stating that
§ 1981 contains no two year restriction on backpay).
40. See Ward v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 823 F.2d 907, 908 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing
Lincoln v. Board of Regents, 697 F.2d 928 (11th Cir. 1983)) (stating that seventh amendment
requires jury trial upon demand for § 1981 suit because of legal nature of remedies, while suit
under title VII provides no constitutional right because of equitable nature of remedies).
41. See Wilson v. City of Aliceville, 779 F.2d 631, 635 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that
plaintiff has no constitutional right to jury trial under title VII because of equitable nature of
remedies). But see Beesley v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 723 F. Supp. 635, 652 (N.D. Ala. 1989)
(holding that title VII plaintiff has constitutional right to jury trial).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(4) (1982).
43. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing use of both § 1981 and title
VII to redress employment discrimination).
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With the emergence of section 1981 as a remedy for private employment
discrimination in the early 1970s, section 1981's relationship to title VII
became an area of great confusion. The circuit courts split on whether a
title VII action was a prerequisite to a section 1981 action. 44 At least two
defendants even argued that title VII implicitly repealed section 1981 .4S The
Supreme Court rejected this argument in 1975 when the Court held that
section 1981 and title VII offered separate, distinct, and independent remedies.46
In addressing the scope of section 1981, the United States Supreme
Court's opinion in Runyon v. McCrary47 confirmed that section 1981
protected plaintiffs against private employment discrimination. 41 In Runyon
the Court considered whether section 1981 prohibited private, commercially
operated schools from denying admission to applicants solely because of an
applicant's race. 49 In May 1969 Colin Gonzales' parents, responding to a
mass mailing brochure and to an advertisement in the yellow pages of the
telephone directory, submitted an application for Colin to attend FairfaxBrewster School's private summer daycamp.5 0 In response, the Gonzales
family received a form rejection letter.5' Fairfax-Brewster's chairman of the
board later told the Gonzales family that the school was not integrated
and, therefore, Colin could not attend the summer daycamp.5 2 Next the
Gonzales family contacted another private school, Bobbe's School, but
school officials informed the family that the school accepted only cauca-

44. Compare Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500, 503-04 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding
that plaintiff need not pursue title VII remedy before instituting claim under § 1981) with
Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476, 487 (7th Cir.) (holding
that § 1981 plaintiff must show reasonable excuse for failure to exhaust title VII remedies),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
45. See Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097, 1100-01 (5th Cir. 1970) (rejecting
defendants argument that title VII implicitly repealed § 1981), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948
(1971); Rice v. Chrysler Corp., 327 F. Supp. 80, 86-87 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (same).
46. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 461 (1975). The Johnson
Court addressed the issue of whether the filing of a charge with the EEOC pursuant to title
VII tolled the running of the statute of limitations for plaintiff's § 1981 claim. Id. at 455.
The Johnson Court found that § 1981's remedies for the race discrimination plaintiff are
separate from and independent of title VII's administrative remedies. Id. at 461, 465-66.
Accordingly, the Court held that the filing of a charge with the EEOC did not toll the running
of the statute of limitations for plaintiffs § 1981 claim. Id. at 466.
47. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
48. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 (1976).
49. Id.at 163, 168.
50. Id.at 165.
51. Id.
52. Id. At trial Fairfax-Brewster's chairman of the board denied having a conversation
with Mr. Gonzales. Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 1200, 1202 (E.D.
Va. 1973) aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir.
1975), aff'd, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). The chairman testified that the school rejected Colin's
application because Colin's nursery school education did not qualify Colin for the first grade.
Gonzales, 363 F. Supp. at 1202. Conversely, another witness, Mrs. Brynt, testified that school
officials told her that the school was not integrated. Id. at 1203.
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sians. 53 Because Colin was black, the school refused to accept him.5 4 Similarly, in August 1972 Michael McCrary's mother contacted Bobbe's School

regarding admission to the nursery school." School officials also told Mrs.
McCrary that Bobbe's School was not integrated and, accordingly, Bobbe's

School refused to accept Michael.5 6 Colin Gonzalez and Michael McCrary
sued the respective schools in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia alleging that Fairfax-Brewster School and Bobbe's

School denied admission to the boys solely on the basis of their race in
violation of section 1981
The Southern Independent School Association
intervened on behalf of the schools 5 and the district court consolidated

court found in favor of both plaintiffs, 60
the two cases for trial. 9 The district
6'
and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the defendants renewed

their claim that section 1981 does not prevent private schools from racially
discriminating among applicants. 62 The Court noted that three prior United
States Supreme Court decisions concluded that section 1981 originated from
section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.63 Because the Supreme Court
previously had determined that Congress properly enacted section one of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 under its thirteenth amendment powers6 and
because Congress intended section 1981 to prohibit both private and public
53. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 165.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. Michael McCrary, one of the plaintiffs in Runyon v. McCrary, like Colin
Gonzales, was black. Gonzales, 363 F. Supp. at 1202. Bobbe's School officials denied having
a conversation with Mrs. McCrary. Id. Testifying in support of Mrs. McCrary, Mr. Brooks,
Mrs. McCrary's supervisor and a deputy EEOC officer for the Navy, stated that school
officials had told Brooks that the school did not accept blacks. Id. at 1203. In addition to
Mr. Brook's testimony, Mrs. Brynt also testified that school officials informed her that the
school would not accept blacks. Id.
57. Gonzales, 363 F. Supp. at 1203.
58. Id. In Gonzales the Southern Independent School Association did not deny that the
schools did not admit blacks. Id. The association instead argued that Colin and Michael could
not use § 1981 to compel admission of a black child to a private school. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1212.
61. Runyon v. McCrary, 515 F.2d 1082, 1085 (4th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
62. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 167 (1976). After considering whether § 1981
reached private acts of discrimination, the Runyon Court addressed the issue of whether
§ 1981's application against a private school was constitutional. Id. at 175. The Court found
that applying § 1981 to discrimination by private schools in accepting applications did not
violate the constitutionally protected rights of free association and privacy, or a parent's right
to direct the education of their children. Id. at 175-79.
63. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 168-72 (citing Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421
U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 439-40
(1973); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 n.78 (1968)).
64. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968) (stating that enactment
of § I of Civil Rights Act of 1866 was within Congress' power under § 2 of thirteenth
amendment rationally to determine what are badges and incidents of slavery and to translate
that determination into effective legislation).
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discrimination, 65 the Runyon Court concluded that section 1981 reached
private acts of discrimination. 6 Therefore, the Court held that section 1981
prevents a private school from discriminating among applicants based on
race. 67 The Runyon decision implicitly affirmed the trend in the lower courts
to hold that section 1981 provided a remedy for private employment
6
discrimination.
After Runyon, the scope of section 1981 remained unchanged for
thirteen years. The 1988-89 term of the United States Supreme Court,
69
however, brought major changes in the employment discrimination area.
In 1987 the Supreme Court, sua sponte, had ordered reargument in the case
of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union7" on the issue of whether the Court
should overrule Runyon.71 Most of the predecision media coverage and the
amicus curiae briefs focused on the possibility of the Court overruling
Runyon. 72 In light of the Court's earlier opinions in the employment field
during the 1988-89 term 73 and the Court's generally conservative posture,7 4
many civil rights advocates feared that the Court would reverse Runyon. 71

65. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 168 n.8; see also Rice v. Chrysler Corp., 327 F. Supp. 80, 8687 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (stating that Congress intended § 1981 to reach both public and private
discrimination).
66. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 168, 173.
67. Id. at 186.
68. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (discussing lower courts' usage of §
1981 as remedy for private employment discrimination).
69. See generally Blumrosen, The 1989 Supreme Court Rulings Concerning Employment
Discriminationand Affirmative Action: A Minefieldfor Employers and a Gold Minefor Their
Lawyers, 15 EMPL. RE. L.J. 175 (1989) (discussing Supreme Court's employment decisions in
June 1989 and explaining decisions' impact on employers); Pinzler, A Major Change in Bias
Law for the Work Place, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 21, 1989 at 55 (reviewing major employment
discrimination decisions during Supreme Court's 1988-89 term).
70. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143 (4th Cir. 1986), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
71. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617 (1988).
72. See generally Symposium on the Reconsideration of Runyon v. McCrary, 67 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 1 (1989) (discussing whether Patterson Court should overrule Runyon decision).
73. See generally Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989) (limiting time
for plaintiffs to challenge revisions in seniority systems as discrimination); Martin v. Wilks,
109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989) (giving white males unlimited time to challenge court decreed affirmative
action programs); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989) (restricting
disparate impact analysis of race discrimination by requiring plaintiffs to show impact of each
particular employment practice and by changing burden of proof scheme in favor of defendant);
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989) (allowing employer to avoid liability by
showing that employer would have taken same action against employee regardless of discrimination).
74. See generally H. SCnWARTZ, PACKING Tan CouRTs, THE CONSEaRVATnIVES' CAMPAIGN
To REWum THE CoNsnrroN (1988) (discussing conservative leaning of United States
Supreme Court); Coyle & Lavelle, Reagan Legacy Is Alive and Well at High Court, NAT'L
L.J., Feb. 6, 1989, at 5 (arguing that United States Supreme Court has made sharp shift to

right).
75. See Landmark Rights Decision Narrowed, Washington Post, June 16, 1989, at Al
(pointing out that Patterson Court alarmed civil rights advocates when Court ordered rear-
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Therefore, when the Patterson Court decided to affirm Runyon and narrowly interpret the scope of section 1981, many advocates considered the
76
affirmation a small victory.
In Patterson McLean Credit Union hired Brenda Patterson, a black
woman, as a teller and file coordinator. 7 Patterson alleged that during her
initial interview with Robert Stevenson, McLean Credit Union's president,
Stevenson told Patterson that the white women with whom Patterson would
be working probably would not like Patterson because the white women
were not used to working with blacks.78 Patterson also alleged that, when
she complained of her workload some years later, Stevenson replied that
blacks work slower than whites.7 9 Patterson, furthermore, alleged that
Stevenson racially harassed her during the workday.1 As part of her racial
harassment allegation, Patterson complained that Stevenson often stared at
her," ' required her to perform menial tasks,8 2 singled her out for criticism
4
at staff meetings, 3 and promoted a less qualified white employee over her.
McLean Credit Union never promoted Patterson. 5 On July 19, 1982, after
ten years of service, McLean Credit Union laid off Patterson and, subsequently, terminated her employment.8 6 Patterson sued McLean Credit Union
claiming section 1981 violations of racial harassment, failure to promote,
and wrongful discharge. 7 Patterson also included a pendant state claim for
88
intentional infliction of mental and emotional distress.
The District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina granted
McLean Credit Union's motion for directed verdict on the section 1981
racial harassment claim and on the pendant state law claim. 9 The judge

gument on reversing Runyon); Coyle & Strasser, Court's "Redefining" Worries Rights Groups,
NAT'L L.J., June 26, 1989, at 5 (pointing out that Patterson decision put civil rights activists
worst fears to rest).
76. See In One Case, a Positive Development the Critics Shouldn't Ignore, Chicago
Tribune, June 21, 1989 at 19 (arguing that Patterson case was small victory for civil rights
advocates).
77. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1145 (4th Cir. 1986), aff'd in
part, vacated in part, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989). The defendant in Patterson, McLean Credit
Union, hired Brenda Patterson in May of 1972. Id.
78. Patterson, 805 F.2d at 1145.
79. Petitioner's Brief for Writ of Certiorari at 7-8, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989) (No. 85-2394) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
80. See infra notes 81-84 (discussing Patterson's racial harassment arguments).
81. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 79, at 8.
82. See Patterson, 805 F.2d at 1145 (stating that Patterson's menial tasks included tasks
that Stevenson did not ask white employees to do such as dusting and sweeping office).
83. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 79, at 8 (stating that Stevenson singled out Patterson
and another black employee at staff meetings to criticize them for their errors).
84. See id. (alleging that McLean Credit Union promoted white employee with less
education and seniority over Patterson).
85. Patterson, 805 F.2d at 1145.
86. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2369 (1989).
87. Patterson, 805 F.2d at 1144.
88. Id.
89. Joint Appendix at 23(a), Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143 (1989)
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allowed both the section 1981 promotion claim and discharge claim to go

to the jury, which found for McLean Credit Union on both claims. 90
Arguing that the district court judge improperly granted McLean Credit
Union's motion for a directed verdict, Patterson appealed the district court's
judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 9'
On appeal the Fourth Circuit found that racial harassment does not
violate the right to make and enforce a contract under section 1981. 92 The
court explained that title VII rather than section 1981 was the proper forum

for racial harassment claims. 93 The court noted that section 1981 encompasses claims including racially discriminatory hiring, firing, and promotion.9 4 Consequently, the Fourth Circuit held that section 1981 does not
provide a remedy for racial harassment.95 Patterson appealed the Fourth

Circuit's decision to the United States Supreme Court. On appeal to the
Supreme Court, the primary issue was whether racial harassment is cognizable under section 1981.9

(No. 85-2394). In orally granting McLean Credit Union's motion for a directed verdict, the
district court judge in Patterson gave no explanation of the ruling. Id.
90. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 42 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 659, 662
(M.D.N.C. 1985), aff'd 805 F.2d 1143 (4th Cir. 1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 109 S.
Ct. 2363 (1989).
91. Patterson, 805 F.2d at 1144. In addition to appealing the district court's directed
verdict, Patterson argued that the district court judge in Patterson improperly ruled on
evidentiary issues regarding the admissibility of testimony and improperly instructed the jury
on each party's burden of proof for Patterson's promotion claim. Id.
92. Id. at 1146. In addition to affirming the district court's directed verdict on Patterson's
racial harassment claim, the Fourth Circuit in Patterson ruled that McLean Credit Union's
conduct did not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct necessary to sustain a claim of
intentional infliction of mental and emotional distress under North Carolina law. Id. at 114647. The Fourth Circuit also found that the district court did not abuse the court's discretion
in not allowing testimony that Patterson was more qualified 'than the white employee that
McLean Credit Union promoted or in excluding a witness' testimony that Stevenson had
harassed the witness. Id. at 1147. Finally, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's jury
instruction on Patterson's promotion claim, holding that once the employer had given a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's promotion decision, Patterson had to
show that the employer's reason was a pretext and that Patterson was better qualified than
the promoted employee. Id.
93. Id. at 1145; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982) (outlawing discrimination against
any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
because of such individual's race).
94. Patterson, 805 F.2d at 1145.
95. Id.
96. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2369 (1989). In Patterson,
Patterson also appealed the district court's instruction to the jury that, for Patterson to prevail
on her § 1981 discriminatory promotion claim, Patterson must show that she was better
qualified than the white employee who she alleged McLean Credit Union promoted over her.
Id. at 2369. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the instruction holding that once the employer had
given a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's promotion decision, Patterson
had to show that the employer's reason was a pretext, and that Patterson was better qualified
than the promoted employee. Id. On appeal the Supreme Court reversed this portion of the
Fourth Circuit's decision. Id. at 2379. The Supreme Court held that Patterson may give a
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The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion Justice Kennedy
authored, first addressed the issue of whether to overrule Runyon and thus
prevent section 1981 from applying to private discrimination cases. 97 The
Court noted that substantial precedent exists to hold that section 1981

reaches private discrimination. 98 The Court also explained that the burden
on the party advocating reversal is heavier if the party seeks to overrule a

point of statutory construction." Because the Court concluded that the
Runyon decision had not been subverted by changes in the law,'00 was not
an unworkable decision,' 0' and had passed the test of experience,10 2 the
Court affirmed its decision in Runyon.'0° After Patterson, therefore, section
1981 continues to provide a remedy for private discrimination.
After deciding that section 1981 encompasses private employment dis-

crimination, the Patterson Court considered whether section 1981 provides
a remedy for racial harassment. 1 4 The Court separated the relevant language
of section 1981 into two clauses: that all persons have the same right as a
white person to (1) make a contract and (2) enforce a contract. 0 5 The Court
noted that the right to make a contract clause applies only to the time of
entering into the contractual relationship'0 and does not extend to the time
after the parties have entered into the contractual relationship. 0 7 The Court
variety of reasons to show that the employer's reasoning was pretextual and the law does not
require Patterson to show that she was better qualified than the white employee the company
promoted. Id. at 2378-79.
97. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2369.
98. Id. at 2370; see also supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing precedent
supporting argument that § 1981 applies to private race discrimination).
99. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2370.
100. Id. at 2371. Changes in the law had not subverted the Runyon decision because
neither the judiciary or Congress had taken any action which undermined the analysis in
Runyon. Id. at 2370.
101. Id. at 2371. The Runyon decision was not an unworkable decision because the
decision did not create confusion or frustrate the important objectives of other laws. Id. The
Patterson Court rejected the argument that the Runyon Court's interpretation of § 1981
frustrated the Congressional objectives in title VII. Id.; see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (outlining Congress' objectives in enacting title VII).
102. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2371. Because the Runyon decision was consistent with the
prevailing sense of justice in the United States, the decision had passed the test of experience.
Id.
103. Id. at 2372.
104. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2372.
105. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982) (protecting right to make and enforce contract).
106. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2372. The PattersonCourt, in interpreting the right to make
a contract clause of § 1981, stated that the right to make a contract does not extend, as a
matter of either logic or semantics, to conduct by the employer after the employer and
employee have established a contract relationship. Id. at 2373; see also id. at 2376-777 (arguing
that key point in time regarding right to make contract clause is initial formation of contract).
107. See id. at 2372-73 (discussing right to make contract clause of § 1981). The Patterson
Court referred to activity after the parties establish the contractual relationship as postformation
conduct. Id. at 2373. Postformation conduct, the Court determined, applies to an existing
contract obligation, not to the making of the contract. Id. Therefore, the Patterson Court
concluded that § 1981's right to make a contract clause does not prohibit postformation
conduct. Id.
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explained in a footnote that this narrow interpretation is the plain and
common sense meaning of the right to make a contract clause. 08 Because
Patterson's alleged racial harassment clearly occurred after Patterson had
entered into a contractual relationship with McLean Credit Union,' °9 the
Court concluded that Patterson's allegations were not actionable under the
right to make a contract clause of section 1981.110
After evaluating the right to make a contract clause of section 1981,
the Court next considered whether Patterson could gain relief under the
second clause of section 1981, which states that all persons have the same
right as a white person to enforce a contract."' In evaluating the right to
enforce a contract clause, the Court applied the same narrow analysis that
the Court used to interpret the right to make a contract clause." 2 The Court
determined that section 1981 applies to actions that prevent an individual
from gaining access to a legal forum that will address and resolve contract
law claims. 1' 3 The Court approvingly referred to Justice White's dissent in
Runyony 4 which argued that the right to enforce a contract clause of
section 1981 requires only the removal of legal disabilities to sue, be a
party, testify, or enforce a contract." 5 The Court explained that examples
of interference with the right to enforce a contract would include discriminatory statutes, discriminatory practices, private obstruction of nonjudicial
methods of adjudicating disputes, and private discriminatory enforcement
of contracts." 6 Because the Patterson Court found that Patterson's racial
harassment allegations involved postformation conduct and did not implicate
section 1981's right to enforce a contract clause," 7 the Court held that
Patterson's claims were not cognizable under section 1981.11 Consequently,
the Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's dismissal of Patterson's racial
harassment claim." 9
After affirming the dismissal of Patterson's racial harassment claim, 20
the Court found that Patterson's discriminatory promotion claim would be

108. Id. at 2377 n.6 (stating that nothing in Runyon holding compels Court to read
statutory terms "make" and "enforce" beyond their plain and common sense meanings).
109. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text (surveying discriminatory events Patterson alleged).
110. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2374.
111. Id. at 2373; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982) (protecting right to make and enforce
contract).
112. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2373.
113. Id.
114. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 195 n.5 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
115. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2373.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 2372-73 (stating that postformation conduct refers to employer's conduct
after employer has established contractual relationship with employee); supra note 107 (discussing postformation conduct).
118. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2377.
119. Id. at 2373.
120. Id.
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actionable under section 1981 if the promotion was tantamount to entering
into a new contract.'12 The Court stated that promotion is cognizable under
section 1981 only if the promotion would result in a new and distinct
relationship between the employer and employee.'2 As an example of the
formation of a new and distinct relationship, the Court used an analogy of
an associate advancing to partner in a law firm.'2 Because McLean Credit
Union did allege that Patterson's promotion claim was not cognizable under
section 1981, the Court did not apply the new and distinct relationship test
to Patterson's promotion claim.'2 The Court, however, remanded Patterson's promotion claim on other grounds./z5
In evaluating the scope of section 1981, the PattersonCourt's discussion
of the relationship between section 1981 and title VII did not clarify the
confusion between section 1981 and title VII and may only add to the
uncertainty.'26 Although the Patterson Court explained that the Court was
powerless to favor one statute over another, 27 the Court often justified its
narrow interpretation of section 1981 by pointing out that the alleged activity
fell under title VII.'2 The Patterson Court argued that the Court should
eliminate any unnecessary overlap between section 1981 and title VII,12 9 and
the Court attempted to rationalize the overlap that would remain after the

121. Id. at 2377.
122. Id.
123. Id. The PattersonCourt cited Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984), which
held that a female associate's allegation that the associate's law firm failed to advance her to
partnership because of her sex stated a claim under title VII. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2377;
Hishon, 467 U.S. at 78. The Hishon Court noted that the change from associate to partner
is the equivalent of a change from employee to employer. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 77.
124. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2377.
125. Id. at 2379; see supra note 96 (discussing PattersonCourt's finding that district court
judge improperly instructed jury on Patterson's promotion claim). On remand, the Fourth
Circuit instructed the District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina to consider the
question of the cognizability of Patterson's promotion claim an open question. Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 887 F.2d 484, 485 (4th Cir. 1989). The district court concluded that
the promotion that Patterson alleged McLean Credit Union denied her would not have created
a new and distinct relationship between employer and employee. Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 729 F. Supp. 35, 36 (M.D.N.C. 1990). The court found that the two positions were
in the same office, under the same conditions, and compensated in the same manner. Id.
Thus, the court dismissed Patterson's discriminatory promotion claim. Id. at 37.
126. See supra notes 22-43 and accompanying text (discussing relationship between § 1981
and title VII).
127. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2375 (citing Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421
U.S. 454, 461 (1975)) (finding that Court is powerless to favor one statute over another without
more definite statement from Congress).
128. Id. at 2373-75. The Patterson Court in two different paragraphs supported the
Court's finding that § 1981 does not cover postformation conduct, by concluding that postformation conduct is actionable under title VII. Id. at 2373-74. In two other paragraphs the
Patterson Court noted that a finding that § 1981 covered postformation conduct would
undermine the objectives of title VII. Id. at 2374-75.
129. See id. at 2375 n.4 (arguing that unnecessary overlap between § 1981 and title VII
would upset delicate balance title VII strikes between employer and employee).
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The Court concluded that under the Court's narrow

interpretation of section 1981, the statute no longer conflicted with congressional intent under title VII.'1 By narrowly interpreting section 1981,
the Patterson Court limited the scope of section 1981 in favor of enhancing
the importance of title VII.

Holding that racial harassment is not actionable under section 1981,
the Patterson Court enunciated a bright line rule'3 2 that section 1981's right
to make a contract clause only applies to the initial formation of the
contract. 33 The Court in dicta, however, backed away from the bright line
rule for the right to make a contract clause by allowing discriminatory

promotion claims in certain situations.

34

Consequently, the lower courts

have struggled to determine what events sufficiently resemble the relationship

of promotion to the initial formation of a contract to warrant section 1981
protection. 35 While the lower courts have had no trouble determining that
racial harassment is no longer cognizable under section 1981,1 6 the lower
courts after the Patterson decision have labored to define the scope of the
137
right to make a contract clause.

Applying the same narrow analysis to section 1981's right to enforce a
contract clause, the PattersonCourt held that the right to enforce a contract
clause only protects access to a legal forum.

3

The lower courts, however,

have had difficulty applying the Court's bright line rule. The courts have

130. Id. at 2374-75. The PattersonCourt rationalized the overlap that would remain after
the Patterson decision, namely discriminatory hiring claims, by arguing that title VII's conciliation procedures are meaningless in the hiring situation because no relationship exists between
employer and employee for the court to salvage. Id.
131. See id. at 2371 (stating that sound construction of language of § 1981 does not
frustrate objectives of title VII); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971)
(stating that objectives of Congress in enacting title VII were to achieve equality of employment
opportunities and to remove barriers that have operated in past to favor identifiable group of
white employees over other employees).
132. See Torres v. Oakland Scavanger Co., 108 S. Ct. 2405, 2412 n.* (1988) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (noting that certainty, clarity, and predictability are advantages of bright line
rule).
133. See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text (discussing Patterson Court's analysis
of right to make contract clause of § 1981).
134. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text (discussing Patterson Court's analysis
of relationship between promotion and § 1981).
135. See Jones v. United States Postal Serv., 1990 US Dist Lexis 821, *16 n.19 (D. Del.)
(arguing that refusal to renew a contract is similar to promotion and, therefore, is actionable
under § 1981).
136. See, e.g., Risinger v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation, 883 F.2d 475, 479
(6th Cir. 1989) (stating that Patterson decision clearly precludes claims of racial harassment);
Matthews v. Freedman, 882 F.2d 83, 85 (3d Cir. 1989) (same); Carroll v. General Accident
Ins. Co. of Am., 891 F.2d 1174, 1177 (5th Cir. 1990) (overturning plaintiff's jury award for
$144,950 on plaintiffs § 1981 racial harassment claim).
137. See supra notes 145-228 and accompanying text (surveying lower court decisions
discussing wrongful termination and retaliation claims after Patterson decision).
138. See infra notes 111-16 and accompanying text (discussing Patterson Court's analysis
of right to enforce contract clause of § 1981).
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struggled to define the scope of the right to enforce a contract clause 139 and
to determine when a plaintiff has gained access to a legal forum.4 Clearly
the Patterson Court was less than prophetic when the Court stated that the
lower courts would have little trouble applying the straightforward principles

in the opinion.'14 In interpreting the Pattersondecision, the major areas of
conflict among the lower courts in applying the Patterson Court's bright
line rules for section 1981's right to make a contract clause and right to
enforce a contract clause focus on the issues of wrongful termination, 142
retaliation, 43 and discriminatory promotion.44
Wrongful termination typically occurs when an employer fires an employee because of the employee's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. 4 Before the Pattersondecision, the courts unanimously agreed that
section 1981 provided a remedy for a wrongful termination claim based on
race. 146 Of twenty-six cases on point after the Pattersondecision, only four

held that section 1981 provides a remedy for wrongful termination. 47 On
the other hand, twenty-two cases, nine of which the District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois decided, held that section 1981 does not provide

a remedy for wrongful termination.

4

139. Compare Booth v. Terminix Int'l Co., 722 F. Supp. 675, 676 (D. Kan. 1989) (finding
that wrongful termination is directly related to contract enforcement) with Thomas v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 1989 US Dist Lexis 11284, *4 (D. Kan.) (holding that right to enforce contract
clause does not provide remedy for wrongful termination).
140. See Alexander v. New York Medical College, 721 F. Supp. 587, 588 n.5 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (concluding that plaintiff's presence before court demonstrates that defendant has not
denied plaintiff access to legal forum). Compare Dangerfield v. Mission Press, 1989 US Dist
Lexis 8985 *5 (N.D. Ill.) (holding that retaliation for filing EEOC claim did not impair
plaintiff's access to legal enforcement in state courts or under title VII) with Yates v. Western
Elec. Co., 1989 US Dist Lexis 14940, *9 (D. Kan.) (holding that retaliation for filing EEOC
claim interferes with right to enforce established contract obligations).
141. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2377 n.6 (1989).
142. See infra notes 145-95 and accompanying text (discussing wrongful termination).
143. See infra notes 196-228 and accompanying text (discussing claim of retaliation).
144. See infra notes 229-53 and accompanying text (discussing discriminatory promotion).
145. See generally Padilla v. United Airlines, 716 F. Supp. 485 (D. Colo. 1989) (finding
that defendant wrongfully terminated plaintiff).
146. See, e.g., Edwards v. Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 855 F.2d 1345, (8th Cir. 1988)
(holding that § 1981 prohibits employer from discharging employee if motivating factor of
discharge is employee's race); Meade v. Merchants Fast Motorline, Inc., 820 F.2d 1124, 1125
(10th Cir. 1987) (finding that plaintiff, who employer terminated because of plaintiff's race,
stated claim under § 1981); London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 1981)
(holding that § 1981 provides remedy for discriminatory discharge).
147. See Booth v. Terminix Int'l Co., 722 F. Supp. 675, 676 (D. Kan. 1989) (concluding
that Supreme Court did not address discriminatory discharge and holding that termination is
part of contract enforcement); Birdwhistle v. Kansas Power and Light, 723 F. Supp. 570, 575
(D. Kan. 1989) (same); Kolb v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Retardation and Dev., 721 F. Supp.
885, 902-06 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (failing to grant defendant's summary judgment motion on
plaintiff's claim of wrongful termination); Padilla v. United Air Lines, 716 F. Supp. 485, 490
(D. Colo. 1989) (holding that wrongful termination violated plaintiff's right to make contract).
148. See Joseph v. Zachary Manor Nursing Home, 729 F. Supp. 41, 42 (M.D. La. 1990)
(holding that wrongful termination is postformation conduct and, therefore, is not actionable
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After the Patterson decision the courts have had problems deciding
wrongful termination cases for several reasons. First, the Patterson district
court jury found for the defendant, McLean Credit Union, on Patterson's
wrongful termination claim. 49 Accordingly, the district court rejected Patterson's wrongful termination plea under section 1981.150 Because Patterson
did not appeal the issue to the Fourth Circuit or to the United States
Supreme Court, the issue of wrongful termination was not before the
Supreme Court.' Thus, the lower courts have disagreed over whether the
Patterson Court's reasoning applies to wrongful termination claims. 5 2 A

under § 1981); Boykin v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 1990 US Dist Lexis 536, *7 (N.D. Ill.) (holding
that wrongful termination is not cognizable under § 1981); Coleman v. Domino's Pizza, Inc.,
728 F. Supp. 1528, 1531 (S.D. Ala. 1990) (same); Guerro v. Preston Trucking Co., 1989 US
Dist Lexis 15175, *17 (N.D. Ill.) (same); Dumas v. Phillips College of New Orleans, Inc.,
1989 US Dist Lexis 14188, *1 (E.D. La.) (holding that because wrongful termination is not
part of making of contract, plaintiff's claim is not actionable under § 1981); Johnson v.
United States Elevator Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1344, 1344 (E.D. Mo. 1989) (holding that wrongful
termination is not actionable under § 1981); Matthews v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 1989 US
Dist Lexis 12926, *1-2 (S.D.N.Y.) (same); Williams v. Edsal Mfg. Co., 1989 US Dist Lexis
12606, *6 (N.D. Ill.) (same); Brown v. Avon Prods., Inc., 1989 WL 122334, 7-8 (N.D. Ill.)
(same); Crader v. Concordia College, 724 F. Supp. 558, 562 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (same); Thomas
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 1989 US Dist Lexis 11284, *4 (D. Kan.) (finding that wrongful
termination occurs after parties have entered into contract relationship and, therefore, does
not implicate right to make contract nor right to enforce contract); Stinson v. American
Sterilizer Co., 724 F. Supp. 868, 871-72 (M.D. Ala. 1989) (dismissing plaintiff's wrongful
termination claim because wrongful termination is psotformation conduct); Rivera v. AT&T
Information Sys., 719 F. Supp. 962, 965 (D. Colo. 1989) (same); Bush v. Union Bank, 1989
US Dist Lexis 10936, *4 (W.D. Mo,) (holding that wrongful termination is not actionable
under § 1981); Jones v. Altech Assocs., 1989 US Dist Lexis 10422, *16 (N.D. Ill.) (same);
Morgan v. Kansas City Area Transp. Auth., 720 F. Supp. 758, 760-61 (W.D. Mo. 1989)
(vacating jury verdict for plaintiff on plaintiff's wrongful termination claim because of
Patterson decision); Rick Nolan's Auto Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 718 F. Supp.
721, 722 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that insurance company's termination occurs after contract
relationship and, therefore, is postformation conduct, which § 1981 does not cover); Gonzalez
v. Home Ins. Co., 1989 US Dist. Lexis 8733, *1 (S.D.N.Y.) (explaining that termination of
plaintiff, who was agent for defendant, because plaintiff contracted with minorities was
pQstformatiqn conduct not actionable under § 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 909 F.2d 716
(2nd Cir. 1990); Greggs v. Hilman Distrib. Co., 719 F. Supp. 552, 554 (S.D. Tex. 1989)
(holding that wrongful termination is not actionable under § 1981 because wrongful termination
concerns neither making nor enforcing of contracts as Patterson decision defined terms);
Woods v. Miles Pharmaceuticals, 1989 US Dist Lexis 7642, *1 (N.D. Ill.) (dismissing complaint
that included charge of wrongful termination); Carter v. Aselton, 50 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 251, 251 (M.D. Fla. June 20, 1989) (dismissing claim of wrongful termination); A.
RUZICHO, L. JACOBS, & L. TmAHER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION (Pre-Publication Supp.) (1989) (stating that after Patterson discriminatory termination is no longer actionable under § 1981); 8 Empl. Coordinator (Research Inst. Am.) 82,631 (Aug. 21, 1989) (same).
149. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing jury verdict in district court).
150. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 42 Fair Empl. Prac. Case (BNA) 659, 662
(M.D.N.C. 1985), aff'd 805 F.2d 1143 (4th Cir. 1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 109 S.
Ct. 2363 (1989).
151. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing issues that Patterson appealed
to Supreme Court).
152. Compare Padilla v. United Air Lines, 716 F. Supp. 485, 490 (D. Colo. 1989)
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second reason courts have had problems deciding wrongful termination cases
ss
is that wrongful termination is clearly within the scope of title VII.'
Because the Patterson decision sought to prevent overlap between section
1981 and title VII, s4 most courts conclude that title VII is the only remedy
for wrongful termination,' but at least one court has rejected this conclusion.5 6 A final reason courts have had problems deciding wrongful termination cases is that the Fourth Circuit stated in its Patterson opinion that
claims of "discriminatory hiring, firing and promotion" go to the existence
of the contract and fall under section 1981's protection. 57 In discussing
Patterson's promotion claim, the Supreme Court quoted the Fourth Circuit's
wording, but left out the words "hiring" and "firing." 15 8 Because the
Supreme Court omitted the word "firing," the lower courts cannot determine whether the Court agreed with the Fourth Circuit's statement, whether
the Court did not address the issue because the issue was not before the
Court, or whether the Court could not agree on this issue. The omission
of the word "firing," therefore, further has confused the issue of whether
section 1981 allows for wrongful termination claims.1 59 Consequently, the
district court's jury verdict, the scope of title VII, and the Patterson Court's
omission of the words "hiring" and "firing" has led to conflict among the
lower courts over whether section 1981 provides a remedy for wrongful
termination.
After the Patterson decision, both the District Court of Colorado and
the District Court of Kansas held that wrongful termination is actionable
under section 1981. In reaching this conclusion, however, the two courts
used different rationales. In a case before the District Court of Colorado,
Padilla v. United Air Lines,'60 United Air Lines employed the plaintiff as
a temporary employee for an eighty-nine day period.' 6 ' After the eighty(explaining that wrongful termination claim was not before Patterson Court and, thus, is
actionable under § 1981) with Rivera v. AT&T Information Sys., 719 F. Supp. 962, 964 (D.
Colo. 1989) (noting that wrongful termination was not before Patterson court, but concluding
that plaintiff's wrongful termination claim was no longer cognizable under § 1981).
153. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982) (stating that employer discharging employee
because of employee's race constitutes unlawful employment practice).
154. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2375 n.4 (1989) (stating
that unnecessary overlap between title VII and § 1981 would upset title VII's delicate balance
between employer and employee rights).
155. See Hall v. Cook County, 719 F. Supp. 721, 724 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (noting that title
VII is more appropriate than section 1981 as remedy for wrongful termination).
156. See Padilla v. United Air Lines, 716 F. Supp. 485, 589-90 (D. Colo. 1989) (rejecting
defendant's argument that title VII and not § 1981 is appropriate remedy for wrongful
termination).
157. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1145 (4th Cir. 1986), aff'd in
part, vacated in part, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
158. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2377 (1989).
159. See Padilla, 716 F. Supp. at 490 (citing Fourth Circuit's language of hiring, firing,
and promotion in Pattersonto support court's holding that wrongful termination is actionable
under § 1981).
160. 716 F. Supp. 485 (D. Colo. 1989).
161. Padilla v. United Air Lines, 716 F. Supp. 485, 487 (D. Colo. 1989).
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nine day period expired, United Air Lines terminated the employee. 162 The
plaintiff employee alleged that United Air Lines terminated the employee

for racial reasons and, therefore, violated section 1981.163 The District Court
of Colorado, explaining that a wrongful termination claim was not before
the Supreme Court in Patterson,'" found that termination is part of the
making of a contract. 6- The court reasoned that a person who an employer
has terminated for racial reasons is in the same position as a person who
an employer does not hire because of the person's race-each person has
no job. 166 Concluding that the plaintiff properly brought the wrongful

termination claim under the right to make a contract clause of section 1981,
the court held in favor of the plaintiff employee.167

Similar to Padilla, the plaintiff employee in a case before the District
Court of Kansas, Birdwhistle v. Kansas Power and Light,16 contended that

the employer discharged the plaintiff because of the plaintiff's race. 169 In
response, the employer contended that the employer discharged the plaintiff
because of the plaintiff's repeated tardiness. 70 Like the Colorado court, the

District Court of Kansas pointed out that a wrongful termination claim was
not before the Supreme Court in Patterson.'7 ' The District Court of Kansas,
however, concluded without explanation that termination is part of the
enforcement of a contract. 172 The Birdwhistle court held that the plaintiff
properly brought the wrongful termination claim under the right to enforce

a contract clause of section 1981.173 The courts in Padilla and Birdwhistle,
therefore, allowed wrongful termination claims under different clauses of
section 1981.

162. Id. The Padilla court concluded from the plaintiff's evidence that United Airlines
permanently hired less than one-third of the employees originally hired as temporary employees.
Id. Specifically, during the time period of Padilla's complaint, United Airlines permanently
hired 52 of 163 temporary employees. Id. r
163. Id. at 486.
164. Id. at 489; see also supra notes 194-51 and accompanying text (noting that wrongful
termination claim was not before Patterson Court).
165. Padilla, 716 F. Supp. at 490. Because termination effects the existence of the contract
and not merely the terms of the contract, the Padilla court concluded that termination is part
of the making of a contract. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. 723 F. Supp. 570 (D. Kan. 1989).
169. Birdwhistle v. Kansas Power and Light, 723 F. Supp. 570, 572 (D. Kan. 1989).
170. Id. at 573.
171. Id. at 575; see also supra note 164 and accompanying text (discussing Padillacourt's
recognition that wrongful termination claim was not before Patterson Court).
172. Birdwhistle, 723 F. Supp. at 575.
173. Id.; see also Booth v. Terminix Int'l Co., 722 F. Supp. 675, 676 (D. Kan. 1989)
(holding that wrongful termination is cognizable under contract enforcement clause of § 1981).
In Booth the plaintiff, Booth, claimed that Terminex discharged Booth because of his race.
Id. The Booth court noted that wrongful termination was not before the Patterson Court. Id.
Following the court's decision in Birdwhistle, the Booth court ruled that termination is part
of contract enforcement. Id. The court, therefore, held that Booth could bring a claim of
discriminatory discharge under § 1981. Id.
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In contrast to the holdings in Padilla and Birdwhistle, a majority of
courts addressing wrongful termination claims under section 1981 have

concluded that wrongful termination is not cognizable under section 1981.174
Judge Rovner's opinion for the District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois in Hall v. Cook County175 is typical of the opinions that deny
wrongful termination actions under section 1981.176 In Hall the defendant,

Cook County Hospital (the Hospital), employed the plaintiff, Hall, under
177
an employment contract for ten years before the Hospital terminated Hall.
The Hospital contended that the Hospital terminated Hail because he

committed a "major cause infraction" of the hospital rules. 178 Hall, how179

ever, contended that the hospital terminated him for racial reasons.
Although admitting that the Patterson Court did not squarely address the
wrongful termination issue, 180 the Hall court chose not to follow the Padilla

court's lead in narrowly construing the Patterson decision., Instead, the
Hall court concentrated on the Patterson Court's distinction between preformation conduct and postformation conduct. 18 2 Thus, because Hall had
secured an employment contract and because the Patterson Court held that

section 1981 did not apply to postformation conduct,183 the Hall court
concluded that the right to make a contract clause of section 1981 no longer

concluded, therefore, that Hall must look to
protected Hall.' 4 The 1court
85
title VII for a remedy.
Under the PattersonCourt's bright line rule for the right to make and
enforce a contract, 88 the lower courts finding that wrongful termination
does not fall under section 1981187 have the better position.,

The Supreme

174. See supra note 148 (surveying cases holding that § 1981 does not provide remedy for
wrongful termination).
175. 719 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ili. 1989). The issue in Hall presented itself in the form of
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Id. at 722 n.l. Judge Rovner had stayed the case in October
1988 pending a decision in the Patterson case. Id. at 722.
176. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (surveying cases holding that § 1981 does
not provide remedy for wrongful termination).
177. Hall v. Cook County, 719 F. Supp. 721, 722 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 723.
181. Id. at 723-24; see also supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text (discussing Padilla
court's analysis of wrongful termination claim).
182. Hall, 719 F. Supp. at 723-24; see also supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text
(discussing postformation conduct).
183. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2373-74 (1989).
184. Hall, 719 F. Supp. at 724.
185. Id. at 723, 725. Although the Hall court stated that Hall must seek a remedy under
title VII instead of § 1981, the Hall court earlier had dismissed Hall's title VII claim because
the claim was untimely. Id. at 722. Therefore, the court's dismissal of Hall's § 1981 claim left
Hall with no remedy. Id. at 725.
186. See supra notes 104-16 and accompanying text (discussing § 1981's right to make
and enforce contract clauses).
187. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (surveying cases holding that § 1981 does
not provide remedy for wrongful termination).
188. See infra notes 189-91 and accompanying text (supporting conclusion that after
Patterson, § 1981 does not provide remedy for wrongful termination).
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Court explicitly held that section 1981 provides no remedy for postformation
conduct.18 9 In explaining postformation conduct, the Patterson Court noted
that some promotion claims would be the equivalent of entering into a new
contract relationship.90 Termination, however, is the ending of the contractual relationship and is, therefore, the complete opposite of contract formation. Logic demands the conclusion that termination is postformation
conduct. Thus, wrongful termination no longer should be actionable under
section 1981's right to make a contract clause.
Similarly, wrongful termination should not be actionable under section
1981's right to enforce a contract clause. Although one lower court, to
avoid the postformation problem, has held that the right to enforce a
contract clause provides a remedy for wrongful termination,' 9' the Patterson
Court narrowly interpreted the right to enforce a contract clause to prohibit
an employer from preventing an employee from gaining access to a legal
forum that could address the employee's claims.192 By terminating an employee, an employer does not prevent the employee from seeking relief in
a legal forum. 93 The employee is free to pursue relief under state contract
law 94 or under title VII. 95 After the Patterson decision, therefore, the
appropriate remedy for wrongful termination is title VII and not section
1981.
Similar to wrongful termination, a claim of retaliation develops if an
employer fires or demotes an employee for a nonlegitimate reason. In
contrast to wrongful discharge, however, a retaliation claim arises if an
employer discharges or demotes an employee in retaliation for the employee's
filing of a complaint with the EEOC. 96 A retaliation claim also arises if
an employer discharges or demotes an employee for speaking out against
discriminatory policies.'9 Although plaintiffs may have a claim for retalia189. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2373-74 (1989).
190. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text (discussing under what circumstances
§ 1981 may provide remedy for discriminatory promotion).
.191. See Booth v. Terminix Int'l Co., 722 F. Supp. 675, 676 (D. Kan. 1989) (holding
that discriminatory discharge is actionable under § 1981's right to enforce contract clause);
Birdwhistle v. Kansas Power and Light, 723 F. Supp. 570, 575 (D. Kan. 1989) (same); supra
notes 168-73 and accompanying text (discussing Booth and Birdwhistle).
192. See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text (discussing § 1981's right to enforce
contract clause).
193. See Alexander v. New York Medical College, 721 F. Supp. 587, 588 n.6 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (suggesting that plaintiff's presence before court demonstrates that defendant has not
denied plaintiff access to legal forum).
194. See Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 381 S.E.2d 445, 448 (N.C. 1989) (discussing state

law contract claims for wrongful termination under either bad faith exception to employment
at-will doctrine or under implied covenant of good faith and fair dealings).

195. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(a)(1) (1982) (prohibiting termination because of race).
196. See Dangerfield v. Mission Press, 1989 US Dist Lexis 8985, *5 (N.D. Ill.) (analyzing

situation in which employer demotes employee in retaliation for employee's filing of complaint
with EEOC as retaliation claim).
197. See Woods v. Miles Pharmaceuticals, 1989 US Dist Lexis 7642, *1 (N.D. Ill.)
(considering plaintiff's claim of retaliation for plaintiff's complaints to EEOC of defendant's

discriminatory practices).
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tion under title VII,19s like wrongful termination claims, all of the courts

addressing retaliation claims prior to the Patterson decision allowed retaliation claims under section 1981.1 99 After the Patterson decision, however,
the Ninth Circuit and eight district court cases held that section 1981 does

not provide a remedy for retaliation. 200 In contrast, three district court cases
allowed retaliation claims under section 1981. 201

198. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1982) (making retaliation unlawful under title VII).
199. See, e.g., Miller v. Fairchild Industries, Inc., 885 F.2d 498, 503-04 (9th Cir. 1989)
(concluding that employee may seek relief for retaliatory discharge under both title VII and
§ 1981); Choudhbury v. Polytechnic Inst., 735 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that plaintiff
has right to hearing on § 1981 claim of retaliation); Goff v. Continental Oil Co., 678 F.2d
593, 598 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that § 1981 encompasses retaliation by employer against
employee for filing EEOC charge or civil rights lawsuit).
200. See Overby v. Chevron USA, Inc., 884 F.2d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that
Patterson decision precluded Overby's § 1981 retaliatory discharge claim); Lewis v. B.P. Oil,
Inc., 1990 US Dist Lexis 787, *2-3 (E.D. Pa.) (dismissing plaintiff's claim that included
allegations of retaliation for plaintiff's complaints of racial harassment); Gregory v. HarrisTeeter Supermarkets, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1259, 1261-63 (W.D.N.C. 1990) (holding that because
retaliation is postformation event, right to make contract clause does not provide plaintiff
remedy and that because plaintiff was before court, right to enforce contract clause does not
provide plaintiff remedy); Matthews v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 1989 US Dist Lexis 12926,
*2-3 (S.D.N.Y.) (holding that defendant's firing of plaintiff's key witness did not violate
plaintiff's right to enforce contract); Alexander v. N.Y. Medical College, 721 F. Supp. 587,
588 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that claims of retaliatory discharge and demotion no longer are
actionable under § 1981); Hall v. Cook County, 719 F. Supp. 721, 725 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
(noting that allegation of retaliation does not affect court's decision to dismiss wrongful
termination claim); Dangerfield v. Mission Press, 1989 US Dist Lexis 8985, *5 (N.D. Ill.)
(holding that retaliation for filing EEOC claim did not impair plaintiff's access to legal
enforcement in state courts or under title VII); Woods v. Miles Pharmaceuticals, 1989 US Dist
Lexis 7642, *1 (N.D. Ill.) (dismissing plaintiff's § 1981 claim of retaliation for plaintiff's
complaints of discriminatory practices); Williams v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 716 F.
Supp. 49, 51-52 (D.D.C. 1989) (holding that plaintiff's claims of discriminatory working
conditions and pay are not enforceable contract rights under Patterson court's interpretation
of § 1981, and, therefore, plaintiff's claims that defendant retaliated against plaintiff for
attempting to enforce these contract rights must fail).
201. See Yates v. Western Elec. Co., 1989 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14940, *7-9 (D. Kan.) (holding
that Yates's allegation that Western Electric retaliated against Yates for filing charge with
EEOC states claim under right to enforce contract clause of § 1981); Jordan v. United States
W. Direct Co., 716 F. Supp. 1366, 1368-69 (D. Colo. 1989) (refusing to dismiss plaintiff's
claim that United States West retaliated against plaintiff because plaintiff complained of
discrimination and instigated investigation of charges). Similar to Yates and Jordan the District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois in English v. GeneralDevelopment Corp. held that
a plaintiff's allegations of retaliation do not state a claim under § 1981 after Patterson. English
v. General Dev. Corp., 717 F. Supp. 628, 633 (N.D. Il. 1989). The English court neatly
avoided the postformation issue by finding that the company discharged the plaintiffs for their
protests to discriminatory hiring practices towards third parties. Id. Thus, plaintiffs' actions
were not postformation conduct in relation to the third parties' contracts. Id.
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Malhotra v.
Cotter& Co. refused to rule on whether § 1981 encompasses retaliation, the concurring opinion
suggested that retaliation remains cognizable under § 1981. Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885
F.2d 1305, 1314-17 (7th Cir. 1989). Reasoning that a prohibition against retaliation is necessary
for the very viability of the right against discrimination, the concurring opinion pointed out
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In the Ninth Circuit case of Overby v. Chevron USA, Inc., 2° 2 the

defendant, Chevron, terminated the plaintiff, Overby, a black male, because
Overby refused to allow security personnel to search him. 20 3 Overby alleged
that the true reason for the discharge was retaliation for a claim that Overby
filed with the EEOC but later voluntarily withdrew. 204 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Overby was complain-

ing of postformation conduct 2 5 because Overby had entered into an employment contract in February 1978 when Chevron hired Overby. 20 1
Additionally, the Overby court found that Chevron had not impeded Ov-

erby's ability to enforce Overby's contract because Overby filed a claim
with the EEOC. 207 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit held that the Patterson
decision precluded Overby's retaliation claim under section 1981 .208 The
Overby case is unique because the plaintiff voluntarily withdrew the plaintiff's EEOC complaint. 209 Although the Ninth Circuit might have reached

a different conclusion if the plaintiff had not withdrawn the complaint, the
Overby court emphasized that title VII offers the plaintiff a remedy for
210
retaliatory discharge.
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, like the Ninth
Circuit, found that a claim of retaliation no longer was actionable under
section 1981.21 In Dangerfield v. Mission Press212 Enoch Dangerfield and
two other plaintiffs alleged discriminatory demotion and racial harassment,
including derogatory comments, intense scrutiny, and verbal abuse. 21 The
plaintiffs further alleged that these actions were in retaliation for the
plaintiffs' filing of complaints with the EEOC. 2 4 The Dangerfield court,
with no analysis, concluded that the employer's actions did not impair the
plaintiffs' access to legal enforcement in either state courts or under title

that if an employer can retaliate against an employee for protesting discriminatory policies,
the employee has no rights. Id. at 1314. Furthermore, the concurring opinion interpreted the
Patterson Court's analysis of the right to enforce a contract to support the argument that
claims of retaliation remain cognizable under § 1981 because retaliation impairs the employee's
ability to enforce the employee's contract rights. Id. at 1314 n.1.
202. 884 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1989).
203. Overby v. Chevron USA, Inc., 884 F.2d 470, 471 (9th Cir. 1989).
204. Id. at 472. In Overby Overby filed his claim with the EEOC in April 1983. Id. at
473. Overby did not allege that Chevron coerced Overby into withdrawing his claim. Id.
205. Id. at 473; see also supra note 107 (discussing Patterson Court's definition of
postformation conduct).
206. Overby, 884 F.2d at 473.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 472. In Overby, Overby withdrew his April 1983 EEOC complaint in September
1983. Id.
210. Id. at 473. Because title VII covers plaintiff's allegations of retaliatory discharge,
the Overby court refused to broadly interpret § 1981 as covering the same conduct. Id.
211. Dangerfield v. Mission Press, 1989 US Dist Lexis 8985, *3 (N.D. Ill.).
212. 1989 US Dist Lexis 8985 (N.D. Ill.).
213. Dangerfield v. Mission Press, 1989 US Dist Lexis 8985, *3 (N.D. Ill.).
214. Id.
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Therefore, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' section 1981 claims of
21 6
racial harassment and retaliation.
In contrast to the decisions of the Ninth Circuit and the District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, the District Court of Colorado found
that a claim of retaliation was actionable under section 1981 in Jordan v.
United States West Direct Co. 217 The plaintiff, Timothy Jordan, alleged
that his employer, United States West, demoted him after Jordan complained
of discriminatory company policies and after Jordan had instigated a
Colorado Equal Employment Office investigation of the company. 2 8 The
Jordan court, with no analysis, concluded that Jordan's allegations fell
under the right to enforce a contract clause of section 1981 . 219 Specifically,
the court concluded that Jordan's allegations fell under the Patterson
language stating that the enforcement clause applies to private efforts to
obstruct nonjudicial methods of adjudicating discrimination disputes. 220
Therefore, the Jordan court denied United States West's motion to dismiss
the retaliation claim.2
Under the Patterson Court's bright line rule of preformation/postformation conduct, 2m a claim of retaliation should not be actionable under
section 1981's right to make a contract clause. Before an employer can
discharge or demote an employee, the parties already must have entered
into a contractual employment relationship. Under the Patterson rationale,
therefore, because retaliation is a postformation event, a claim of retaliation
should not be cognizable under section 1981's right to make a contract
clause.m2 Neither should the right to enforce a contract clause offer the
plaintiff relief after the Patterson decision. 22AThe PattersonCourt's opinion
indicates that to obtain the protection of section 1981's enforcement clause,
22
the plaintiff must be foreclosed from any access to the legal process.
Because the discharged or demoted employee always will have access to the
legal process under either title VII226 or under state contract law, 227 after
VII.215

215. Id.
216. Id.
217. 716 F. Supp. 1366, 1369 (D. Colo. 1989).
218. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 1, Jordan v. United States W. Direct Co., 716 F.
Supp. 1366 (D. Colo. 1989) (No. 88-C-1982).
219. Jordan v. United States W. Direct Co., 716 F. Supp. 1366, 1368-69 (D. Colo. 1989).
220. Id.; see also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2373 (1989) (stating
that enforcement clause of § 1981 applies to private efforts to obstruct nonjudicial methods
of adjudicating discrimination disputes).
221. Jordan, 716 F. Supp. at 1369.
222. See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text (discussing Patterson Court's analysis
of § 1981's right to make contracts clause).
223. Id.
224. See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text (discussing Patterson Court's analysis
of right to enforce contract clause of § 1981).
225. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2373 (1989).
226. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1982) (making retaliation unlawful under title VII).
227. See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
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Patterson the right to enforce a contract clause, like the right to make a
contract clause, should be unavailable to most plaintiffs.M
Although failing to address wrongful termination and retaliatory conduct, the Patterson Court expressly allowed promotion to remain actionable

under section 1981 even though promotion clearly is postformation conduct. 9 The Court reasoned with little explanation that some promotion
claims may be tantamount to entering into new contracts.2 0 After Patterson
the lower courts have struggled to determine when a promotion would create

a new and distinct relationship between an employer and an employee and,
therefore, be cognizable under section 1981.
The District Court of Colorado in Luna v. City of Denver' considered
whether discriminatory promotion is actionable under section 1981 after the
Patterson decision. 232 In Luna the plaintiff employee, Luna, a Filipino,
claimed that the defendant employer promoted a white person instead of

Luna. 233 In response the defendant contended that a change in position from
Project Inspector I to Engineer III would not change Luna's responsibilities

and, therefore, was not actionable under section 1981.2

4

The Luna court

held that the question of whether the defendant failed to promote Luna for

discriminatory reasons was a decision for the jury and not the judge.23
Thus, the Luna court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment,
which argued that the Patterson decision barred as a matter of law Luna's
discriminatory promotion claim.Y6

Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989) (No. 85-2394) (discussing state law
contract claims under implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); 45B Am. JuR. Job
Discrimination § 2292 (1986) (listing state job discrimination laws).
228. See Gregory v. Harris-Teeter Supermarkets, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1259, 1261-63 (W.D.N.C.
1990) (holding that plaintiff's retaliation claim is not actionable under § 1981's right to make
contract clause nor § 1981's right to enforce contract clause).
229. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text (discussing when § 1981 may provide
relief from discriminatory promotion).
230. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2377 (1989) (stating that
promotion claim is actionable under § 1981 if promotion results in new and distinct relation
between employer and employee).
231. 718 F. Supp. 854 (D. Colo. 1989).
232. Luna v. City of Denver, 718 F. Supp. 854, 856 (D. Colo. 1989).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 856-57. In response to defendant's argument in Luna that a change in position
from Project Inspector I to Engineer III would not change Luna's responsibilities, Luna argued
that as Project Inspector I defendant required Luna to use the time clock and paid Luna
overtime. Id. at 857. The position of Engineer III was exempt from these requirements. Id.
235. Id. at 857. The Luna court concluded that the evidence indicated substantial differences between Project Inspector I and Engineer III in terms of supervisory responsibility,
duties performed, and required qualifications. Id. Thus, the Luna court found that a reasonable
juror could conclude that the change in position from Project Inspector I to Engineer III
created a new and distinct relationship between employer and employee. Id.
236. Id. at 859; see also Williams v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 728 F. Supp. 1004, 1009
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (allowing plaintiff's claim of failure to promote from assistant manager to
assistant treasurer because change in position involved change from employee to officer and
included increased supervisory responsibility and salary modifications); Miller v. Shawmut
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Similar to Luna, the Fourth Circuit in Mallory v. Booth Refrigeration

Supply Co. 237 addressed a discriminatory promotion claim. 238 In Mallory the
plaintiff employees, Mallory and Byrd, alleged that the defendant employer,

Booth Refrigeration, discriminated against the plaintiffs in determining
wages and awarding promotions. 239 Specifically, the plaintiffs who were
clerks alleged that the defendant neglected to consider the plaintiffs for
supervisory positions.? The Mallory court found that a promotion from

clerk to supervisor with a consequent increase in responsibility and pay
would satisfy the Patterson Court's new and distinct relationship test.21
Because the district court found that the defendant did not discriminate
against the plaintiffs, however, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court, holding that Mallory and Byrd did not prove that the defendant

intentionally discriminated against the plaintiffs .

2

In addition to the District Court of Colorado and the Fourth Circuit,

the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Sofferin v.
American Airlines243 also considered whether a discriminatory promotion
claim is cognizable under section 1981. 2 4 In Sofferin the plaintiff employee,

Bank of Boston, 726 F. Supp. 337, 342 (D. Mass. 1989) (refusing to grant defendant's motion

for summary judgment when plaintiff alleged discriminatory failure to promote from head
teller to personal banker); Matthews v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 1989 US Dist Lexis 12926,
*5 (S.D.N.Y.) (concluding that promotion from field systems installer to systems specialist
would create new and distinct relationship because promotion meant difference between being
blue collar installer and white collar engineer); Green v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 728 F. Supp.
768, 777 (D.D.C. 1989) (concluding that promotion from manager-in-waiting to store manager
satisfied new and distinct relation test because promotion involved change in supervisory and
management responsibilities, salary calculation, and method of evaluation); cf. Malhotra v.
Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1311-12 (7th Cir. 1989) (analyzing in dicta Patterson Court's
test for whether promotion is cognizable under § 1981). The Malhotra court pointed out that
the Patterson rule for promotions creates an anornoly because a stranger applying for a job
could gain relief under § 1981 if an employer rejected the stranger's application for racial
reasons, but an employee seeking the same job may not gain relief because the new job would
not meet the Patterson Court's new and distinct relation test. Id. at 1311. The Malhotracourt
suggested distinguishing promotions when strangers are eligible for the job from promotions
that are merely routine advancements. Id.
237. 882 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1989).
238. Mallory v. Booth Refrigeration Supply Co., 882 F.2d 908, 909 (4th Cir. 1989).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 910-11. Mallory and Byrd argued in Mallory that the defendant promoted a
lesser qualified white employee to a supervisory position in the plaintiffs' department instead
of promoting either Mallory or Bryd. Id. at 909. The Mallory court, however, found that
during the plaintiffs' employment, the defendant had promoted three blacks and four whites.
Id. at 911. Furthermore, the court determined that the defendant's selection criteria for
promotions was valid. Id. at 910. Thus, the court concluded that the district court's determination that the defendant did not discriminate in awarding promotions was not clearly
erroneous. Id. at 911.
241. Id. at 910; see also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2377 (1989)
(stating new and distinct relationship test for § 1981 discriminatory promotion claims).
242. Mallory, 882 F.2d at 911.
243. 717 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
244. Sofferin v. American Airlines, 717 F. Supp. 597, 599 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
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Sofferin, alleged that American Airlines did not change Sofferin's status
245
from a probationary pilot to tenured pilot because Sofferin was Jewish.
The Sofferin court, considering the issue sua sponte, reasoned that the
change from probationary pilot to tenured pilot did not create a new and
distinct relationship because the change in status did not involve a change
in the functions Sofferin performed326 Therefore, the court dismissed Sofferin's section 1981 claim.? 7
Because the United States Supreme Court in Patterson concluded that
the right to make a contract clause of section 1981 only applies to the initial
formation of the contract, a promotion claim arguably does not conform
24
with the court's bright line rule for preformation/postformation conduct. 1
Because an employer only promotes, by definition, employees, a promotion
necessarily occurs after the parties have entered into a contractual relationship. Thus, promotion is a postformation event. Accordingly, because the
Patterson Court's bright line rule removes postformation conduct from
section 1981's scope, promotion arguably is not cognizable under section
1981.2 9 The Patterson Court, however, by concluding that some promotion
claims still will be cognizable under section 1981 after the Patterson decision, 250 recognized that some promotions are so much like entering into a
new contractual relationship that the denial of the promotion violates a
person's right to make a contract2?1 The lower courts must determine on a
case by case basis when a promotion would create a new and distinct
relationship between employer and employee. 25 2 The confusion the Patterson
Court's promotion analysis creates, however, is that once the Court recognizes that a postformation event, promotion, may fall under the protection
245. Id. at 598.

246. Id. at 599.
247. Id.; see also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 729 F. Supp. 35, 36-37 (M.D.N.C.
1990) (concluding that promotion did not form new and distinct relationship between employer
and employee when place of work, working conditions, and manner of compensation stayed
same); Williams v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 728 F. Supp. 1004, 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(concluding that promotion from one supervisory position, assistant manager, to higher level
supervisory position, branch manager, did not create new and distinct relationship); Dicker v.
Allstate Life Ins. Co., 730 F. Supp. 111, 114 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (dismissing plaintiff's promotion
claim because promotion would not result in new and distinct relationship); Anderson v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 1989 US Dist Lexis 12195, *5-6, *8(N.D. Ill.) (dismissing plaintiff's
promotion claim because promotion from supervisor to manager entailed no change in salary
or benefits); Crader v. Concordia College, 724 F. Supp. 558, 563 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (finding
that promotion from Associate Director to Director would not have created new and distinct
relationship).
248. See infra notes 249-53 and accompanying text (discussing why promotion claim does
not conform to Patterson Court's bright line rule).
249. See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text (discussing § 1981's right to make
contract clause and postformation conduct).
250. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text (discussing Patterson Court's new and
distinct relation test).
251. Id.
252. See supra notes 236 and 247 and accompanying text (surveying lower courts' analysis
of discriminary promotion claims).

1990]

SECTION 1981 CLAIMS

of section 1981, the Court no longer has a bright line rule. The promotion
analysis forces the lower courts to determine what events, other than

contract
promotion, should fall under the protection of the right to make a 253
clause even though the event technically is postformation conduct.
CONCLUSION

The unique double enactment of section 1981, first as the Civil Rights

Act of 1866 then as the Enforcement Act of 1870, confused the courts for
almost a century over the scope of section 1981.

2 4
1

By 1975, however, the

United States Supreme Court had decided that section 1981 originates from
the Civil Rights Act of 1866,255 and consequently, the Court held in Runyon
256
v. McCrary that section 1981 applied to private discriminatory conduct.
Because section 1981 applied to private conduct, during the 1970s and 1980s

plaintiffs increasingly used section 1981 in conjunction with title VII as a
remedy for private employment discrimination.2 7 In 1987 the United States
Supreme Court in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union sua sponte ordered

reargument on whether the Court should overrule Runyon. 258 The reargument of whether section 1981 applied to private conduct threatened to
eliminate section 1981 as a remedy for private employment discrimination. 2 9
The Patterson Court, however, declined to reverse Runyon.M Instead,

in analyzing Patterson's racial harassment claim, the Court narrowly interpreted section 1981 .26I The Court limited the right to make a contract clause

of section 1981 to the initial formation of the contract. 262 Thus, the Court

excluded any postformation conduct from the purview of section 1981 .263
The Court, furthermore, interpreted section 1981's right to enforce a con264

tract clause as simply ensuring the plaintiff access to a legal forum.

253. See Jones v. United States Postal Serv., 1990 US Dist Lexis 821, *16 n.19 (D. Del.)
(suggesting that refusal to renew contract is similar to promotion and, therefore, is actionable
under § 1981).
254. See supra notes 2-11 and accompanying text (discussing origins of § 1981).
255. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing United States Supreme Court
finding that § 1981 originated from Civil Rights Act of 1866).
256. See supra notes 47-68 and accompanying text (discussing Runyon v. McCrary
decision).
257. See supra notes 19-46 and accompanying text (discussing use of and relationship
between § 1981 and title VII).
258. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text (discussing ordered reargument of
Patterson).
259. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text (discussing reaction to order of
reargument for Patterson).
260. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text (discussing Patterson Court's affirmation of Runyon).
261. See supra notes 104-25 and accompanying text (discussing Patterson Court's analysis
of § 1981).
262. See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text (discussing Patterson Court's analysis
of § 1981's right to make contract clause).
263. Id.
264. See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text (discussing Patterson Court's analysis
of § 1981's right to enforce contract clause).
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Finally, the Court ruled that if a promotion would create a new and distinct
relationship between an employer and an employee, an employer's discrimination in awarding the promotion would be actionable under section 1981 .265
The Patterson Court, therefore, held that Patterson's racial harassment
claim was not actionable under section 1981 because racial harassment is
postformation conduct, which is not within the scope of section 1981 .2 6 By
strictly interpreting section 1981, the PattersonCourt believed that the Court
had given section 1981 its plain and common sense meaning. 26 7
The lower courts, however, have struggled to apply the Patterson
decision to issues other than racial harassment.265 The lower courts have
split over whether wrongful termination and retaliatory conduct are cognizable under section 1981 after Patterson.269 Furthermore, the lower courts
have struggled to determine when a promotion would result in a new and
distinct relationship between employer and employee. 270 Consequently, the
27
scope of section 1981 remains unclear even after Patterson. '
Despite a sincere attempt, the Patterson Court failed to enunciate a
bright line rule for the application of section 1981 to employment discrimination cases. 272 As the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit argued, perhaps Congress should reform the federal employment
discrimination laws. 273 Without Congressional reform or judicial guidance,
the Patterson decision will not be the last time the Justices of the United
States Supreme Court consider the scope of section 1981.
WooDY W. LAY

265. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text (discussing Patterson's promotion
claim).
266. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text (discussing dismissal of Patterson's
racial harassment claim).
267. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2377 n.6 (1989).
268. See supra notes 135-44 and accompanying text (discussing lower courts' application
of Patterson decision).
269. See supra notes 145-228 and accompanying text (discussing wrongful termination and
retaliation claims after Patterson).
270. See supra notes 229-53 and accompanying text (discussing § 1981 promotion claims
after Patterson).
271. See supra notes 145-253 and accompanying text (discussing lower court decisions
after Patterson).
272. Id.
273. See Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1313 (7th Cir. 1989) (suggesting that
Congress should replace crazy quilt of federal discrimination remedies with single, swift, and
simple administrative remedy).
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Addendum
By passing the Civil Rights Act of 1990, the 101st Congress attempted
to reverse the Patterson decision. See S. 2104, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 12
(1990) (amending language of 42 U.S.C. § 1981). President Bush, however,
vetoed the legislation, and the Senate failed to override the veto.
Furthermore, the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
recently concluded that after Pattersonwrongful termination claims are not
actionable under section 1981. See Gonzalez v. Home Ins. Co., 909 F.2d
716, 722 (2d Cir. 1990); Lavender v. V & B Transmissions & Auto Repair,
897 F.2d 805, 807-08 (5th Cir. 1990); McKnight v. General Motors Corp.,
908 F.2d 104, 108-09 (7th Cir. 1990); Courtney v. Canyon Television
Appliance Rental, Inc., 899 F.2d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 1990); Thompkins v.
DeKalb County Hosp. Auth., 1990 WL 154638 (11th Cir.). Only the Eighth
Circuit continues to allow wrongful termination claims. See Hicks v. Brown
Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 630, 635-49 (8th Cir. 1990).
Finally, the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh circuits have held that after
Patterson section 1981 does not provide a remedy for retaliation claims.
Carter v. South Central Bell Tel. Co., 912 F.2d 832, 840 (5th Cir. 1990);
Christian v. Beacon JournalPublishing Co., 908 F.2d 972 (6th Cir. 1990)
(text on Westlaw); Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d 1527,
1534-35 (11th Cir. 1990). The Seventh Circuit, nevertheless, in dismissing a
section 1981 retaliation claim suggested that if the retaliation deterred the
plaintiff from enforcing a contractual right then the plaintiff's claim may
remain actionable after Patterson. McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908
F.2d 104, 111-12 (7th Cir. 1990).

